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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SECTION
16(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934-WAGMAN V. ASTLE, 380 F. SUPP. 497
(S.D.N.Y. 1974)
The extent to which the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19341 may be applied extraterritorially is currently unsettled.'
There exists a general presumption that, absent express congressional
intent to the contrary, regulatory legislation is not to be applied
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.3 While the
jurisdictional language of the Exchange Act does not clearly indicate
that the Act is to have other than domestic application,4 courts have
given extraterritorial effect to some of its sections,5 particularly the
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1970).
2 See authorities cited in note 6 infra.
3 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
' Express congressional intent concerning the application of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 is found in § 27 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). This section
reads in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States. . . shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder.
Only this sentence of § 27 is directed toward subject matter jurisdiction, Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972), thus the extent
to which the Act should be applied extraterritorially is not clearly indicated.
Nevertheless, § 30(b) does provide an exemption from the Act for anyone "insofar
as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States
.... " 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970). This section arguably exempts foreign defendants
from liability under the 1934 Act if their actions are outside of the United States.
However, the exemption has been interpreted narrowly by the courts, effectively refut-
ing such an argument in most situations. See SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc.,
474 F.2d 354, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1973); Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421, 422
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
200, 206-09 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
partially rev'd, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,080 (2d Cir.
1975). See also Note, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 150 (1971); Note, United States
Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 HAnv. L. REV. 404, 444-52
(1969); Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible Solutions to a Regulatory Dilemma, 3
LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus., 157, 179-91 (1971); Note, The International Character of
Securities Credit: A Regulatory Problem, 2 LAw & POLCY IN INT'L Bus. 147, 155-64
(1970).
' The breadth of the term "extraterritorial" and its myriad connotations prevent
a precise legal definition. Consequently, at times it is unclear whether a court has
applied the 1934 Act extraterritorially or simply has based jurisdiction on territorial
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anti-fraud provisions found in § 10(b).1 However, extraterritorial ap-
principles. In any event, § 10(b) is the only section of the Exchange Act that has been
applied extraterritorially to any significant extent, although the extraterritorial appli-
cation of other provisions has been discussed. See Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405
F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969); Wagman v. Astle, 380 F.
Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Note, The International Character of Securities Credit: A
Regulatory Problem, 2 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 147 (1970).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Basically, § 10(b) declared fraudulent conduct in
securities transactions illegal by authorizing the SEC to establish regulations which
prohibit such conduct. The SEC has promulgated Rule 10b-5 for this purpose. 17
C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1974).
The scope of the extraterritorial application of § 10(b) is uncertain. The following
are principal cases in which the problems and difficulties of the extraterritorial appli-
cation of § 10(b) are discussed: Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,080 (2d Cir. 1975); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,082 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. United
Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.,
473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd
on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Garner v. Pearson,
374 F. Supp. 591 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Madonick v. Denison Mines Ltd., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,550 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Clark,
359 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Investment Properties Int'l Ltd. v. IOS, Ltd., [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,011 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Manus v. The
Bank of Bermuda, Ltd. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,299
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental
Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963); Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); IOS, Ltd. (S.A.), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 78,637 (SEC 1972).
The above cases have been discussed by numerous commentators. A partial list
of publications includes: R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 684-89 (3d
ed. 1972); Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: To-
wards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA.
L. REV. 1015 (1969); Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application
of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAW. 367 (1975);
Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 94 (1969); Note, The Extraterritorial Application of Rule 10b-5, 4 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 81 (1970); Note, The Judicial Role in Extraterritorial Application of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Vesco, 4 GA. J. INT'L COMPARATIVE L. 192 (1974); Note,
United States Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 HARV. L. REv.
404 (1969); Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible Solutions to a Regulatory Dilemma,
3 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 157 (1971); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 168 (1969); Note,
Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 342
(1973); Note, 8 Tmx. INT'L L.J. 430 (1973); Comment, An Interest Analysis Approach
to Extraterritorial Application of Rule 10b-5, 52 TEx. L. REv. 983 (1974); Comment,
The Transnational Reach of Rulia 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1973); Note, 6 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 687 (1973); Note, 7 Vand. J. Transnat'l Law 770 (1974); Note, 20
WAYNE L. Rzv. 169 (1973).
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plication of other sections of the Act has not been as broad as that of
§ 10(b).1
Whether § 16(b),8 which requires the automatic forfeiture of insi-
der profits, 9 applies to securities transactions consummated outside
the United States is unclear. Nevertheless, a court presented with the
question of the extraterritorial application of either § 10(b) or § 16(b)
must initially make a two-fold determination. The court must deter-
mine whether subject matter jurisdiction may be inferred, and if so,
it must then find whether personal jurisdiction may be properly as-
serted over the defendant."° One prerequisite to subject matter juris-
diction in a § 10(b) action is the use of an instrumentality of United
States commerce by the defendant in accomplishing part of his
fraud.11 In addition, the imposition of § 10(b) liability requires a
finding that the defendant acted with intent to cause foreseeable
harm within the United States. 2 These two elements of § 10(b) liabil-
ity generally suffice to fulfill the requirements of personal and subject
matter jurisdiction in actions involving the extraterritorial applica-
tion of this provision. 3
Unlike § 10(b), § 16(b) imposes virtually strict liability on its
offenders. Section 16(a), 4 which was enacted in conjunction with §
7 See authorities cited in note 5 supra.
Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) reads in pertinent part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship tothe issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity secu-
rity of such issuer ... within any period of less than six months...
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.
See text accompanying notes 14-17 infra.
" See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972).
" Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1970).
Ii The exact degree of scienter, intent or foreseeability necessary in order to re-
cover under § 10(b) is currently unsettled. Note, The Development of a Flexible Duty
Standard of Liability Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 99 (1975). See
2 A. BROMBERG, SEcum'riEs LAw: FRAUD, SEC RuLE 10b-5, § 8.4 (501 et seq.) (1973).
1' See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). Section 16(a) and § 16(b) are interrelated, to some
degree, and were enacted to eliminate, or at least to reduce, insider abuse. S. REP. No.
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16(b), requires all directors, officers, and 10% beneficial owners of
certain issuers " to file disclosure statements reflecting any changes
in their holdings of the issuer's securities. Individuals who are re-
quired to disclose are considered "insiders" and under § 16(b)18 must
forfeit all profits realized from the purchase and sale, within a six
month period, of any equity security of the issuer. Recovery of these
"short swing" profits is not dependent upon a showing that the profits
were realized through actual abuse of insider information. Rather,
automatic liability is imposed in order to eliminate any possible
abuse of inside information." Thus, Congress did not intend that §
16(b) liability be contingent on proof of those elements necessary to
establish a violation of § 10(b). Accordingly, in § 16(b) actions there
is no need to prove that the defendant used an instrumentality of
interstate commerce or that he foresaw harm to American interests. 8
The absence of both the interstate commerce and the culpability
requirements as elements of a § 16(b) violation exacerbates the prob-
lems inherent in the two-fold jurisdictional determination that a
court must make when giving extraterritorial application to § 16(b). 9
These problems become even more acute when insider profits are
realized by a foreign defendant from transactions conducted solely
through a foreign securities exchange. Thus, despite similarities in
analysis, substantial distinctions exist between the extraterritorial
application of § 10(b) and that of § 16(b).
These distinctions are illustrated in Wagman v. Astle,0 a recent
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934);
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5-6 (1934); Note, 25 VAND. L. REV. 660, 661-
62 (1972).
," An issuer must be required to register with the SEC under § 12 of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970), before its insiders are subject to § 16. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
" For the pertinent text of § 16(b) see note 8 supra.
': See note 14 supra.
, Although § 16(b) does require that a violator have used an instrumentality of
interstate commerce in order for liability to be imposed, as does § 10(b), there is no
constitutional problem because all insiders who are held liable under § 16(b) will have
dealt with securities listed or traded in the United States' interstate commerce.
" As previously noted, the term "extraterritorial" has many connotations. See
note 5 supra. In an extraterritorial application of § 16(b) there are essentially seven
situations where problems of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or both
could arise:
Nationality/Residence Situs of the Secur- Nationality/Resi-
Of Indurer ities Transactions dence of Insider
1. U.S. U.S. Foreign
2. U.S. Foreign Foreign
3. U.S. Foreign U.S.
4. Foreign U.S. U.S.
5. Foreign U.S. Foreign
6. Foreign Foreign U.S.
7. Foreign Foreign Foreign
The seventh sittiomnn nrp.qpntq fh mnt writp ii1"rqrlitf;nnal n-1me o Q ,. W--
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decision from the Southern District of New York. In Wagman the
plaintiff brought a derivative suit to force three Canadian residents
who were officers of a Canadian corporation (Dome) to disgorge short
swing profits to the corporation. Dome securities were traded on the
American Stock Exchange and the corporation was registered with
the SEC."' The defendants admitted realizing short swing profits
from transactions involving Dome securities,2 but asserted that there
was neither domestic conduct by them nor a domestic effect from
their acts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. They
emphasized that all of the transactions had occurred in Canada with-
out utilization of the American Stock Exchange or any instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce. Further, the defendants contended that
since § 16(b) liability is automatic the transactions giving rise to
liability could not be presumed to have had an actual substantial
effect in the United States.n They also argued that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over them because the acts giving rise to their
short swing profits occurred entirely in Canada. This assertion was
bolstered by the fact that the officers were residents of Canada who
neither conducted business nor were served with process in the
United States.
4
The Wagman court declined to reach the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction and instead dismissed the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the defendants.n The decision thus affords at least
some degree of immunity to foreign insiders who realize short swing
profits. However, since Wagman is a case of first impression,2" the
extent of this immunity is uncertain. Indeed, the Wagman court
intimated that § 16(b) could have extraterritorial application in cer-
tain undefined circumstances if personal jurisdiction could be as-
serted over the defendants.Y
21 Id. at 498-99.
22 Brief for Plaintiff at 5.
1 Brief for Defendant at 4-18.
24 380 F. Supp. at 499. The defendants also argued that venue was improper. Id.
11 Id. at 502-03.
21 However, the Wagman plaintiff noted one similar lawsuit, Glicken v. King, 69
Civ. 1847 (N.D. Ill. East.Div.). The American Stock Exchange forced settlement of
that suit with the defendant insider forfeiting all of his insider profits to a Canadian
Corporation. Plaintiff Reply Brief to Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 3-4.
" The court stated that [a] case can be imagined in which individual foreign
defendants come into, do business in, or knowingly cause an actual effect in this
country, in connection with a transaction which violates the provisions of § 16(b)." 380
F. Supp. at 502 n.6.
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The tacit recognition by the Wagman court of potential extraterri-
torial application of § 16(b) acknowledged the recent judicial trend
expanding the coverage of the Exchange Act to transactions con-
ducted outside of the United States.? This expansion began with
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,9 a landmark decision by the Second Cir-
cuit. In Schoenbaum an American shareholder in Banff Oil Ltd., a
Canadian corporation, brought a derivative action against certain
insiders of Banff and other corporate defendants for alleged § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 violations. Banff securities were listed and traded on
the American Stock Exchange and the corporation was registered
with the SEC. Except for very limited use of the United States mails,
all of the conduct and transactions constituting the alleged fraud
occurred in Canada.2 The court nevertheless held that subject matter
jurisdiction over the alleged violations existed on the basis that Banff
securities were traded on a domestic exchange and the extraterritorial
transactions were detrimental to the interests of American investors.
The court reasoned that
• . . Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterrito-
rial application in order to protect domestic investors who have
purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to
protect the domestic securities market from the effects of im-
proper foreign transactions in American securities."'
The Schoenbaum court did not inquire into either the actual effect
or the extent of the alleged fraud. Rather, the court presumed that
such fraud had a sufficient adverse effect to permit assertion of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.32 Thus, the mere listing of the securities on
an American exchange coupled with the alleged § 10(b) fraud involv-
ing those securities was an adequate basis for applying § 10(b) extra-
territorially.?
21 See notes 5 and 6 supra.
405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 405 F.2d
215 (1968); cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
405 F.2d 204-05.
31 Id. at 206.
1 Id. at 208-09.
3 Id. at 206-09. The interstate commerce requirement in § 10(b) ensures that,
even in extraterritorial applications of the provision, each defendant found liable will
have had some contact within the United States. Whether the domestic contact is
sufficient to enable a court to assert subject matter jurisdiction is unclear. See SEC v.
United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973). However, in Schoenbaum,
the court stated that subject matter jurisdiction was proper without any consideration
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Decisions rendered subsequent to Schoenbaum have more fully
developed the circumstances in which an extraterritorial application
of § 10(b) is proper and have limited to some degree the rather broad
scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction that was intimated in the earlier
case.34 For example, in Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.,15 an American
plaintiff brought a § 10(b) action against a predominantly foreign
group of defendants for self dealing and misrepresentation that
caused the plaintiff to refrain from selling securities of a corporation
not registered or listed on an American exchange. 6 There were two
separate § 10(b) claims asserted by the plaintiff. One was based on
misrepresentation and nondisclosure propagated in both Canada and
the United States, and the other was for illegal self dealing occurring
solely in Canada. The court determined that the defendant's use of
American mails was sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction
over the first claim. On the second claim, the court determined that
the defendants' use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce was
sufficient to fulfill the § 10(b) requisites, but that such use was insuf-
ficient to satisfy the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction.
Rather, jurisdiction over the second claim was asserted on the basis
that the defendants' extraterritorial acts caused an actual adverse
effect in the United States.37 The court concluded that this adverse
effect was direct and foreseeable, and that the assertion of subject
matter jurisdiction was consistent with the principles of international
law.
38
of the domestic conduct of the defendants. Once the court determined that § 10(b)
applied to the defendants' foreign transactions, it then considered whether the "use of
an instrumentality of interstate commerce" prerequisite was sufficiently met. 405 F.2d
at 210.
3 See authorities cited in note 6 supra. The courts seem more comfortable in
asserting subject matter jurisdiction where there is some act within the United States
itself that constitutes an essential part of the fraudulent activity in extraterritorial §
10(b) actions. See e.g., SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1973) (court asserted subject matter jurisdiction in a § 10(b) action but noted that
there were more acts within the United States by the defendants than the mere use of
interstate commerce in their scheme). However, since § 10(b) requires some use of
interstate instrumentalities within the United States, it is difficult to ascertain
whether any additional domestic acts are required for courts to assert subject matter
jurisdiction. See Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAw. 367 (1975).
31 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
31 Id. at 518-19, 524-28.
Id. at 520-28.
Id. at 528. The court was willing to presume that Congress intended the extra-
territorial application of § 10(b). However, the court properly indicated that such
application of § 10(b) should not be extended beyond the principles recognized in
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Similarly, in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell,3" the plaintiff brought a § 10(b) action against the defen-
dants, most of whom were British, for the fraudulent sale of securities
of a foreign corporation. The securities were neither registered nor
listed on an American exchange." The Second Circuit held that the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action because
some of the misrepresentations essential to the alleged fraud had
occurred in the United States. 4' The court, in dictum, stated that had
the misrepresentations occurred solely outside of the United States
it would have been hesitant to assert subject matter jurisdiction.2
international law.
The principle that a state has jurisdiction over conduct within its borders is
embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 17 (1965). See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1339 (2d Cir. 1972). This principle is commonly referred to as the territorial
principle of jurisdiction. Conduct outside of the United States may also suffice as a
basis for asserting subject matter jurisdiction. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). Cf. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285
(1911). See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), partially reu'd on
other grounds on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). This
objective territorial principle is expressed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965) as follows:
§ 18. Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Effect within
Territory
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an
effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as consti-
tutent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have
reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activ-
ity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is
substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with
the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have rea-
sonably developed legal systems.
It is within the power of Congress to extend the limits of the jurisdiction of American
courts, but it is unlikely that the courts would or should go beyond the limits expressed
in § 18 of the Restatement without evidence of express congressional intent. See Com-
ment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363, 1370 (1973).
This does not necessarily mean that all provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 should be extended to the outer limits of international law, but only that it should
not be presumed that Congress intended to go beyond those limits. Id. 1369-70.
s' 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
4o Id. at 1330-34.
" Id. at 1334-39.
42 Id. at 1334.
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The Travis and Leasco decisions imply that something more than
a presumed harmful effect within the United States is required before
a court may properly assert subject matter jurisdiction in an extrater-
ritorial § 10(b) action. 3 The use of an instrumentality of interstate
commerce sufficient to satisfy the literal terms of § 10(b) does not
necessarily constitute a satisfactory basis for subject matter jurisdic-
tion. The courts concluded that Congress did not intend an automatic
application of § 10(b) when an alleged extraterritorial fraud involved
only an incidental use of interstate commerce. Nevertheless, both
decisions emphasized that a defendant's domestic conduct in perpe-
trating an essentially extraterritorial fraud could provide a basis for
the application of § 10(b) to the whole of the defendant's scheme. 44
Further, neither of these cases involved securities registered or listed
on a national exchange as was the case in Schoenbaum.
Consequently, the limitations placed upon the extraterritorial
application of § 10(b) are not clear. In the absence of significant
domestic conduct it appears that, at the minimum, either the securi-
ties involved must have been registered and listed on a national ex-
change, or the defendant must have foreseen adverse effects within
the United States in order for a court to entertain the case. Appar-
ently, the primary concern of the Travis and Leasco courts was to
ensure that a court would not assert subject matter jurisdiction over
fraudulent transactions if there had been no effect on a vital national
interest.
While the § 10(b) cases provide helpful analysis in determining
the extent of the extraterritorial application of § 16(b), they are not
dispositive of the issue. Unlike § 10(b), § 16(b) has no statutory
requirement that an instrumentality of interstate commerce have
been used. However, in all such actions the issuer will be a North
American corporation 45 registered with the SEC and its securities will
be traded within the United States." Whether these factors alone are
sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction over transactions
consummated outside of the United States and involving foreign insi-
ders is uncertain.
7
" See Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAw. 367, 372-75 (1975).
" See Note, Extra Territorial Application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 34
OHIO ST. L.J. 342, 346-53 (1973).
11 See notes 52-55 and accompanying text infra.
48 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
'7 Section 16(b) has been applied extraterritorially. In Roth v. Fund of Funds,
Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969), § 16(b) liability
was imposed on a Canadian corporate defendant doing business in Switzerland who
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In Wagman foreign defendants realized short swing profits from
transactions consummated entirely outside the United States. On
these facts it could be inferred from the Leasco and Travis decisions
that the Wagman court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Further, since § 16(b) liability is automatic, there arguably was ab-
sent that foreseeability of harm which would constitute a basis for
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Schoenbaum opinion supports
the premise that the Wagman court did have jurisdiction over the
action since the insiders realized their profits from transactions in
securities registered and listed on an American exchange. This view
is reinforced by the Schoenbaum court's assertion that Congress in-
tended subject matter jurisdiction to attach to extraterritorial activ-
ity which could harm domestic securities markets.
While the extraterritorial § 10(b) cases suggest contradictory con-
clusions with respect to extraterritorial application of § 16(b), con-
sistency in those opinions may be discerned in their reliance upon
congressional intent in reaching their results. Similarly, the extent to
which § 16(b) should be extended extraterritorially will depend upon
the policy and intent behind the specific provisions of the section.
In its deliberations over the passage of the 1934 Act, Congress was
vitally concerned with insider abuse:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hear-
ings before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their
fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who
realized insider profits on the New York Stock Exchange. The court held that Congress
intended § 16(b) liability to attach to foreign insiders as well as to Americans since
the effect of insider trading was the same regardless of the nationality of the insider.
Id. at 422. However, because the conduct creating liability was domestic, the court did
not have to consider whether the presumed adverse effect of insider trading would
alone suffice to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The Roth decision, while to some
extent overcoming the presumption against the extraterritorial application of § 16(b),
only required forfeiture of insider profits realized through domestic trading and did not
reach a wholly extraterritorial transaction.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Roth defendant contended that §
30 of the 1934 Act exempted it from liability. Section 30 provides that any person who
transacts a business in securities outside of the United States is exempt from the Act.
See note 4 supra. The Roth court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, and
most important, the court concluded that since the insider profits were realized within
the United States, the requirements of § 30 that the defendant's dealings be without
the United States was not met. Second, despite the situs of the defendant's trading,
there was no exemption since § 30(b) refers only to individuals who transact a business
in securities as opposed to investing in securities. 405 F.2d at 422. The implied result
from this narrow interpretation of § 30(b) is that the court viewed § 16(b) to have
extraterritorial application except where expressly prohibited.
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used their positions of trust and the confidential information
which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their
market activities."
Congress concluded that all insider abuse had a potentially detrimen-
tal impact on investor confidence and American interests.49 Section
16 was thus enacted with a requirement of full disclosure by insiders
of their transactions in the issuer's securities together with an en-
forcement provision of automatic forfeiture of any short swing prof-
its°
5 0
The rationale for the remedial provisions of § 16 indicates that to
require disclosure by foreign insiders pursuant to § 16(a) without the
concomitant forfeiture of insider profits is contrary to congressional
intent. The imposition of liability for short swing profits only upon
insiders who realize their profits within the United States would re-
sult in an inconsistent application of § 16(b), since the situs of insider
trading has no basic relevance to the harm Congress recognized was
caused by such trading. 1
Congress delegated responsibility for dealing with the special
problems that could arise regarding the extraterritorial application of
the Act's provisions to the SEC. Fruition of this congressional policy
is evidenced by the SEC's continual regulation of foreign securities
since 1934, especially the exemption of only non-North American
foreign issuers from the Act's registration requirements. 2 Indeed, the
1964 Amendment by Congress brought even more foreign issuers
within the scope of the Act,53 while explicitly granting the SEC au-
43 S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
4' S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1934).
-1 See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). See generally Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the
Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 385, 612 (1953). For some specific examples
of the types of insider abuse that Congress was attempting to eliminate, see S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1934).
" Cf. Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421, 422 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 975 (1969). See note 47 supra.
52 The SEC exempts certain issuers from the registration requirements of the 1934
Act, but these exemptions do not apply to any North American issuers. Rule 12g3-2(d),
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(d) (1974). Since certain foreign issuers are not subject to these
requirements neither are the insiders of these issuers subject to § 16. Rule 3a 12-3, 17
C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1974).
*1 Section 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970) was added and provided that all issuers
who met certain conditions and engaged in interstate commerce or whose securities
were traded in interstate commerce shall comply with the Securities Exchange Act of
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thority to exempt from the strictures of § 16 those insiders whose
compliance with this section would not be in the public interest.54
Significantly, the SEC has never exempted North American issuers
and their insiders from the operation of § 16.
Since Congress determined, in essence, that the transactions giv-
ing rise to insider profits have an adverse effect on American markets
and investor confidence, the conduct creating such profits should
provide the courts with a sufficient basis for asserting subject matter
jurisdiction and imposing the § 16(b) penalty of forfeiture. For Amer-
ican investors to remain assured that the protections afforded by §
16 are viable, that section must be consistently applied to all insiders
required to file disclosure statements with the SEC." This applica-
tion is not unduly harsh since all officers, directors, and 10% benefi-
cial owners have notice of their possible § 16(b) liability through
compliance with the disclosure requirements of § 16(a). These indi-
viduals, even if foreign, may derive substantial benefit from the list-
ing and trading of issuers' securities within the United States. Their
required compliance with the disclosure provisions of § 16(a) should
subject them to the operation of § 16(b). Whether the transactions
violating § 16(b) occur in New York or Canada, the harm to the
interests Congress sought to protect are similar. Thus, had the court
addressed the issue in Wagman, jurisdiction should have been as-
serted over the Canadian transactions that created the short swing
profits for the Canadian defendants. 5 The intent of Congress was
that federal courts should have subject matter jurisdiction over §
16(b) actions regardless of the location of the transactions giving rise
to the insider profits.
1934's reporting requirements and shall register with the SEC.
51 Section 12(g)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(3) (1970). The SEC was specifically author-
ized to exempt the officers, directors and 10% beneficial owners who would have other-
wise had to comply with § 16 of the Act pursuant to the 1964 Amendment. See note
53 supra. This exemption is authorized by § 12(h), 15 U.S.C. § 781(h) (1970).
The Senate Committee on the 1964 Amendment noted the SEC's policy of ex-
empting foreign issuers other than North American and Canadian issuers and gave
tacit approval to that policy. S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1964). See H.R.
REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1964).
m To the extent the 1934 Act places a hardship on issuers, and therefore issuers'
insiders, the SEC has the power to make certain necessary exemptions it determines
to be in the public interest. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
" The court in Wagman did not reach the issue of subject matter jurisdiction since
it determined that it did not have personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants. 380
F. Supp. at 502.
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Personal Jurisdiction
Concluding, however, that the federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over all § 16(b) violations is not tantamount to stating
that all § 16(b) violators can be forced to disgorge their insider profits.
Courts must have personal jurisdiction over the defendants in order
to render judgment.57 In this regard, § 27 of the 1934 Act58 reflects a
congressional intent to have personal jurisdiction asserted to the
broadest extent possible in order to bring offenders within the courts'
power. 9 The only limits on this power are the traditional "minimum
contacts" necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process."
Section 27 provides that service of process is proper in any district
in which the defendant either conducts business or may be found."'
5' Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). See 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60[10] (2d ed. 1974); C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 65 (2d ed. 1970).
Section 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) reads in pertinent part:
Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any
act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or
action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules
and regulation thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter
or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the
district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district
of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant
may be found.
The first sentence and the first portion of the second deal with venue. Only the last
portion of the second deals expressly with service of process. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972).
" Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339-40 (2d
Cir. 1972). The Wagman defendants argued that congressional intent in 1934 could not
have included express extraterritorial service of process over foreign defendants. "It
was not until McGee v. Internatiohal Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, decided in 1957, that
non-consensual in personam jurisdiction based on extraterritorial service was accepted
in the Federal Courts." Defendant's Reply Brief to Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at
8 (emphasis in original). However, this overlooks the continual congressional scrutiny
and approval of the securities laws since 1934; especially the tacit approval of the
SEC's handling of securities regulation. See notes 48-54 and accompanying text supra.
The Supreme Court defined the boundaries of due process in the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); and International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064
(9th Cir. 1974), noted in 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 249 (1974).
1 See note 58 supra. However, the defendants in Wagman argued that proper
extraterritorial service of process was contingent upon satisfaction of one of the four
venue requirements. Brief for Defendant at 19-23. The Leasco court rejected these
contentions however, and held that those venue provisions do not affect or apply to
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In a federal securities action personal service on a defendant in the
United States eliminates the need for minimum contacts with the
forum.2 Consequently, if a corporate insider realizes short swing pro-
fits from transactions on the New York Stock Exchange and is served
with process while in New York, the district court for southern New
York will have personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if he is
an alien. 3 Further, a New York district court would have personal
jurisdiction over a Canadian defendant served with process in Michi-
gan even if the unlawful profits were realized from transactions in
Canada."' However, when a foreign defendant reaps insider profits
from transactions in-Canada and also is served with process in Can-
ada, as in Wagman, due process limitations may intervene.
Due process requires that a defendant have certain minimum con-
tacts within the territory of the forum "[s]uch that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Thus, the only limit on extraterritorial service
process was due process. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972).
Note that Rule 4(i) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts authorizes service on a party not within a state where service is to be
made outside of the United States if federal law (§ 27 of the Act) so provides.
62 Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974). The court in this case
stated that in a federal question jurisdiction action a federal court has personal juris-
diction over a defendant found anywhere in the United States. The court added that
only when the defendant is outside the United States would the question of a forum's
power to assert control over that defendant arise. Id.
However, in Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), the court took a more restricted view on whether it had personal jurisdiction
over defendants served with process within the United States but outside of its forum
in a § 10(b) action. The court developed a balancing test for determining whether it
should assert personal jurisdiction over defendants outside of its forum but within the
United States. It stated that the due process standard of fundamental fairness must
be met where a defendant is beyond the forum. Id. at 203.
" SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
See Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
975 (1969).
11 See note 62 supra. However, the venue provisions of § 27 should not be over-
looked. Venue is proper only where the act or transaction occurred, or in the district
where the defendant resides, is an inhabitant or transacts business. See note 58 supra.
Therefore, it appears that the venue requirements of the 1934 Act are more stringent
than the requirements for personal jurisdiction. These venue requirements, neverthe-
less, do not apply to aliens. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1970) states that: "[a]n alien may
be sued in any district." The Supreme Court has taken the view that this section
removes the application of all federal venue statutes in suits against aliens. Brunette
Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus. Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1972). Thus, in § 16(b)
actions against foreign defendants venue is proper in any district court.
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stantial justice.' ,,i Since effective service of process cannot be made
without it," a minimum contact is a necessary prerequisite to the
maintenance of an extraterritorial action when the defendants are
outside of the United States. However, the contact need not consist
of an act consummated within the United States. When an extraterri-
torial act has significant consequences within the United States, a
court may assert jurisdiction over the individual who was responsible
for the act and its consequential domestic effects. 7
Due process problems are rare in extraterritorial § 10(b) actions,
however; due to the nature of the particular statutory provisions."5
Section 10(b) requires that both domestic conduct and foreseeable
harm be shown before imposing § 10(b) liability.69 These elements
normally fulfill the due process requirements for personal jurisdic-
tion. Nevertheless, Judge Friendly, in Leasco, stated that regardless
of the subject matter jurisdictional requirements of § 10(b), the extra-
territorial conduct of a defendant must, at the minimum, meet the
tests enunciated in § 18 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
before an assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is pro-
per. 0 This section requires that the domestic effects of a defendant's
conduct occur "as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct out-
side the territory."'" Thus, the foreseeability necessary to support a
finding of § 10(b) fraud may not be sufficient to subject a defendant
to a personal judgment when the defendant's conduct is almost solely
extraterritorial. Judge Friendly asserted that "[tihe person sought
to be charged must know, or have good reason to know, that his
conduct will have effects in the state seeking to assert jurisdiction
over him. 7
2
U International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
" Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
,7 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340-41 (2d
Cir. 1972). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 27, 35, 36, 37, 47,
49, 50 (1971). See note 38 supra.
" See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 529 (8th Cir. 1973); Note,
United States Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 HARv. L. REv.
404, 429 n.7 (1969). However, courts have begun to recognize that in § 10(b) actions,
certain defendants may be immune from liability because their contact with the
United States is too minimal to meet the due process requirements necessary for
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326, 1339-44 (2d Cir. 1972).
, See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
70 468 F.2d at 1341. See note 68 supra.
71 468 F.2d at 1341, citing RFsrATEMENT (SECoND) OF THE FOREGN RELA7rONs LAW
OF THE UNrlED STATES § 18(b) (1965). See note 38 supra.
" 468 F.2d at 1341 (footnote omitted); in Leasco the court dismissed one of the
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The Leasco decision provided the essential basis for the Wagman
court's holding that personal jurisdiction could not properly be as-
serted over the defendants. The latter court reasoned that since §
16(b) liability is automatic regardless of any foreseeability of harm,
the defendants could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
forum." Even in Schoenbaum, the Wagman court noted, there was
substantial evidence that the defendants' extraterritorial acts had a
detrimental effect on American investors.74 The Wagman court bol-
stered its conclusion with the assertion that § 16(b)'s rationale was
"that it is unfair for some to profit in ways that others cannot, rather
than that such speculation will adversely affect the price to the detri-
ment of the 'outside' shareholders. '75 Emphasizing that some com-
mentators regard insider trading as having a minimal effect on stock
prices, the court implied that insider trading on foreign exchanges
has no detrimental effect on American markets or investors. Further,
the court noted that no other country has a rule similar to § 16(b),
that Canada expressly rejected such a rule, and that the efficacy and
propriety of § 16(b) has created widespread debate in the United
States.76 These arguments constituted the basis for the court's deter-
mination that an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dants "would 'offend traditional notions of justice and fair play.' 77
While the Wagman court's rationale is persuasive, it is not neces-
sarily correct. The absence in § 16(b) actions of the § 10(b) require-
ments for imposing liability does not conclusively determine that §
16(b) should not be applied outside of the United States. The court's
conclusion that insider trading in Canada has an insignificant impact
in the United States was in contrast to the congressional determina-
tion that, in essence, such trading does have an adverse effect on
American interests.78 Traditionally, courts have not substituted their
defendants in the § 10(b) action for lack of personal jurisdiction. That foreign defen-
dant had prepared false financial reports in England concerning a foreign corporation.
The defendant's only contact with the plaintiff was at a luncheon in England where
the defendant met with the plaintiff's accountant. Id. at 1341-42. Since the defendant
could not have foreseen United States investors relying on his reports any more than
other investors, the degree of foreseeability was not sufficient "[t]o constitute a basis
of personal jurisdiction consonant with due process." Id. at 1342.
380 F. Supp. at 501-02.
7' Iowever, as the Wagman court noted, Judge Lumbard, in Schoembaum, never
discussed the question of personal jurisdiction since it was not an issue.
11 380 F. Supp. at 501.
76 Id.
1 380 F. Supp. at 502, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945).
78 See text accompanying notes 48-56 supra. See Western Auto Supply Co. v.
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own conclusions for those prescribed by Congress." Certainly, as the
Wagman court noted, part of the rationale behind § 16b is the unfair-
ness in allowing insiders to profit from the use of inside information.
However, enactment of the section was also designed to restore the
previously shaken confidence of American investors through the im-
position of an automatic forfeiture penalty of profits realized from
insider trading." By preventing short swing profit taking, Congress
intended both to reduce the evils of market manipulation and to
prevent insider disregard of trust relationships, thereby increasing
investor confidence.8' Thus, the situs of such trading does not appear
relevant to the harm Congress sought to remedy.82
Nevertheless, a presumption of harm from the realization of extra-
territorial short swing profits is insufficient in itself to fulfill the due
process requisites necessary for an assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a § 16(b) violator residing outside of the United States. As the
Leasco court stated, foreseeability of domestic harm is a due process
requirement for an assertion of personal jurisdiction.83 Since § 16(b)
liability is not dependent upon a finding of foreseeability, the
Wagman court concluded that it could not bring the defendants into
its forum." However, this conclusion overlooks the fact that the fore-
seeability requirements may be fulfilled through the operation of §
16(a) in conjunction with § 16(b). Pursuant to § 16(a) the Wagman
defendants filed reports with the SEC which indicated their realiza-
tion of short swing profits." A reasonable inference may be drawn
from the filing of the disclosure statements that not only did the
corporate officers understand the penalty of forfeiture, but that they
were also aware that Congress implemented § 16(b) to counter the
presumed adverse domestic effects of insider trading. While the filing
of disclosure statements alone does not constitute a domestic act
sufficient to support personal jurisdiction,8 the defendants' aware-
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 743 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987
(1966).
11 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
" See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68, 81 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6, 13-14 (1934).
S See note 79 supra.
See Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 975 (1969); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 743
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
0 468 F.2d at 1341.
"380 F. Supp. at 500-02.
m Id. at 499.
8 The Wagman defendants argued that a corporation is not subject to process in
New York merely by having its shares listed on an exchange and having a transfer
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ness of both the automatic penalty and the congressional presump-
tion that insider trading is detrimental to American interests should
constitute a basis sufficient to support an assertion of personal juris-
diction consonant with due process."7
Similarly, the Wagman court's reliance upon Canada's rejection
of a rule comparable to § 16(b) to conclude that it would be unfair
to force a Canadian defendant into an American forum8 apparently
ignores several countervailing considerations. The implication of the
opinion is that unless a foreign country has'a rule imposing liability
similar to our own laws the due process requisites for an assertion of
personal jurisdiction over an alien, in that foreign country, cannot be
satisfied. If this were true, assertion of personal jurisdiction over
many defendants successfully prosecuted in previous extraterritorial
§ 10(b) actions would have been improper. Indeed, in Travis the court
expressly rejected the contention that § 10(b) liability could not be
imposed since Canada did not have a similar rule covering the defen-
dants' Canadian conduct. The Wagman court apparently viewed §
16(b) as an undesirable and unfair provision in the Securities Ex-
change Act, as indicated by the court's statement that § 16(b) has
caused widespread debate within the United States. However, such
debate would scarcely justify judicial emasculation of the statute.
Further, and more importantly, the Wagman court failed to give
adequate consideration to the fact that § 16(b) does not operate
agent in the district. Brief for Defendant at 30, citing Gilson v. Pittsburgh Forgings
Co., 284 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Thus, by analogy, the mere reporting of insider
profits to the SEC by the defendants did not constitute sufficient activity within the
United States to enable the court to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
Brief for Defendant at 30. The defendants further emphasized that the filing of equity
changes with the SEC is independent from the transactions actually giving rise to the
insider profits. Brief for Defendant at 30.
11 It need not be proven that a defendant had actual knowledge of the domestic
effects of his extraterritorial acts in order to fulfill the due process requisites for an
assertion of personal jurisdiction. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972). Further, one should not lose sight of the principal
function of service of process, to give notice and opportunity to be heard. Id. at 1340.
380 F. Supp. at 501-02.
To some extent "fairness to the foreign defendant" implies a consideration of
the degree to which foreign courts will recognize the judgments of American courts.
For discussion of enforcement problems in foreign countries from judgments rendered
in securities cases see Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Possible Solutions to a Regulatory
Dilemma, 3 LAw & PoLcYi INT'L BUS. 157, 170 (1971); Comment, An Interest Analysis
Approach to Extraterritorial Application of Rule 10b-5, 52 TEx. L. Rav. 983, 997-1002
(1974); Note, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAw. 687, 692-93 (1973).
o 473 F.2d at 527-28. The court, however, considered this fairness argument in its
discussion of subject matter jurisdiction.
1975] EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 16(b) 717
against aliens who have no interest or contact with the United States.
The Wagman defendants were officers of a corporation which had
voluntarily subjected itself to the laws of the United States, and these
defendants also had complied with the disclosure provisions of §
16(a). To the extent that their relationship with the corporation was
regulated, the Wagman defendants could be presumed to have im-
plicitly subjected themselves to American service of process." Never-
theless, even if the court did not desire to hold that it automatically
had personal jurisdiction over an alien insider, it should have recog-
nized that one of the primary purposes of the 1934 Act was to ensure
the sanctity of the fiduciary relationship between the insiders and
minority shareholders of a corporation."2 As officers of a corporation
registered with the SEC and listed on a national exchange, the
Wagman defendants, to a certain extent, gained the benefit and pro-
tection of American laws. 3 Certainly, Dome would not have contin-
ued trading its shares in American markets if it did not regard such
trading as beneficial. 4 Thus, the arguments set forth by the Wagman
court concerning the inherent unfairness in subjecting the defendants
to the jurisdiction of an American forum appear to be less than con-
vincing.
Conclusion
If other courts adopt the Wagman rationale, many foreign insiders
will be immune from § 16(b) liability despite their compliance with
§ 16(a). Whether the Wagman decision will "create a new haven for
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFucr OF LAws § 39 (1971) states in part:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual
m ..in other situations where the individual has such a relationship
to the state that it is reasonable for the state to exercise such jurisdic-
tion.
32 See notes 48-56 and accompanying text supra.
" It may be fairly argued that as Dome benefitted from its registration on an
American exchange the opportunities for the realization of insider profits increased.
" However, the Wagman defendants countered that to hold them subject to the
court's jurisdiction would be tantamount to holding that a corporate officer is present
wherever the corporation is present. Brief for Defendant at 31, citing Beckman v.
Ernst, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,462 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
On the other hand, since § 16(b) liability is automatic and the Wagman defendants
admitted reaping insider profits it would seem that aside from personal liabilities, they
would suffer no actual hardship from the court's assertion of jurisdiction over them.
There was no need for the defendants to enter a personal appearance. The only issues
were jurisdictional in nature. In addition, even if there were hardships, the defendants
could request the transfer of the action to a more convenient district court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
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faithless fiduciaries""5 and lead to "flagrant manipulations and fidu-
ciary abuse of trust by corporate insiders,""9 as the plaintiff in
Wagman asserted, is still open to question. At the minimum, the
congressional intent to eliminate profit taking from short swing trans-
actions will be thwarted -to some extent, and this might result in an
erosion of investor confidence in those corporations with foreign insi-
ders. On the other hand, if alien insiders are held liable for insider
profits, foreign incentive to trade and list securities in the United
States may lessen. For this reason it may be better for Congress to
reconsider the desirability of applying § 16(b) and other security
provisions to foreigners. However, this is a legislative consideration
and thus is not appropriate for judicial evaluation.
Since § 16(b) is a remedial statute it should be broadly inter-
preted to carry out legislative intent. An extraterritorial application
of § 16(b) is consistent with congressional policy and probably is
necessary to maintain investor confidence. The realization of insider
profits from transactions outside of the United States does not lessen
the adverse effects of such trading upon American markets. There-
fore, it would seem that United States courts should assert subject
matter jurisdiction over all actions involving a violation of § 16(b),
regardless of the situs of the insider trading. Whether the defendants
will be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts is less clear,
as the Wagman opinion indicates. However, American courts should
be able to assert personal jurisdiction even over § 16(b) violators
outside of the United States. Since all insiders must disclose their
short swing profits to the SEC pursuant to § 16(a), all insiders are
on notice that such profits are realized in violation of § 16(b). This
foreseeability, coupled with the harmful effect on American interests
as determined by Congress, should be sufficient to satisfy the due
process requirements necessary for an assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion.
CLIFFORD LOGAN WALTERS, II
Brief for Plaintiff at 12.
96 Id. at 4.
'7 See, e.g., Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 743
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650,
655 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
11 380 F. Supp. at 501.
